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The purpose of this paper is to suggest a procedure to empirically test the Porter 
hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that environmental regulation not only 
increases environmental quality, but also brings the polluting producers 
information that makes them more resource efficient, as well as able to develop 
new technologies. Specifically, the hypothesis tested is whether there is a positive 
significant correlation between producers’ technical output efficiency and 
environmental regulation. Efficiency is first estimated using a methodology where 
the production technology is represented by a directional output distance function, 
which credits a simultaneous expansion of market goods and contraction of 
emissions. Then, by regressing the obtained efficiency scores on an index that 
approximates environmental regulatory intensity, the Porter hypothesis is 
explicitly tested. The test procedure is applied on 12 Swedish pulp plants during 
1983-1990. The result shows no support for the Porter hypothesis. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Environmental problems, originating from processes of manufacturing market 
goods, are being discussed in public debate and there is a growing interest in the 
effects of different instruments of environmental control. The welfare 
consequences of environmental regulation depend, to a large extent, on how 
economic agents adjust their behavior. This paper concentrates on how producers 
respond to environmental regulation. According to standard neoclassical theory, 
there may be two forces at work simultaneously. First, there is a ‘crowding-out’ 
effect, i.e., environmental investments take place at the expense of productive 
capital, which may lower productivity growth. Second, the productivity level is 
instantly lowered when producers are forced to use more of their resources to 
abate rather than produce income-generating market goods. However, this idea 
has been questioned during the last decade.  
 
Porter (1991) introduces the idea that has come to be known as the Porter 
hypothesis. He asserts that producers actually may benefit and gain 
competitiveness from being subject to environmental regulation. This idea of a 
possible ‘win-win’ option, i.e., that environmental regulation both brings private 
net gains and a cleaner environment, is of course popular among 
environmentalists and policy-makers, since it spares one from the difficult ‘trade-
off’ between environmental and other economic goals. In Porter and van der 
Linde (1995) the arguments for the hypothesis are developed further. The 
dominating argument is that environmental regulation brings information and 
makes producers aware of certain opportunities, e.g., of improving private 
productivity. The productivity change is divided into an efficiency change and a 
technological change. Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that properly crafted 
environmental regulation can serve several purposes, e.g.: “(…) regulation signals 
companies about likely resource inefficiencies and potential technological 
improvements” (p. 99). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a procedure to test the Porter hypothesis 
empirically. The procedure is general in the sense that it can be applied to any 
production process at the plant, industry, or country level. Specifically, it focuses Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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on the efficiency part of the hypothesis by suggesting a procedure for testing 
whether there is a significant positive correlation between producers’ technical 
output efficiency and environmental regulatory stringency.
1  
 
As a first step, technical output efficiency is estimated for each producer included 
in the study. The methodology adopted to compute efficiency scores originates 
from Färe et al. (2002). The production technology is here represented by the 
directional output distance function, which is defined to credit a simultaneous 
expansion of good outputs and contraction of emissions, i.e., bad outputs. The 
distance function is further specified using a quadratic flexible functional form 
and computed by a linear programming technique. In a second step, by regressing 
the resulting efficiency scores on a regulatory intensity index, approximating 
environmental stringency, the efficiency part of the Porter hypothesis is explicitly 
empirically tested. In this paper, the suggested test procedure is applied on 12 
Swedish pulp plants during 1983-1990. 
 
Hetemäki (1996) and Marklund (1999) explicitly test the efficiency part of the 
Porter hypothesis in a similar way. However, they apply a Shephard output 
distance function to compute the efficiency scores, which credits a simultaneous 
expansion of all outputs. This means that the producers are interpreted as 
becoming more efficient when increasing both good and bad outputs 
proportionally, which may be problematic in this context. Other studies that 
investigate the impacts of environmental regulation on efficiency, but not in the 
purpose of explicitly testing the Porter hypothesis, are Boyd and McClelland 
(1999) and Hernández-Sancho et al. (2000). They apply hyperbolic efficiency 
measures that assume producers to become more technically output efficient when 
they simultaneously increase good outputs and decrease bad outputs. However, 
the approach they adopt to analyze the impact of environmental regulation is 
based on the assumption that regulation either does not affect the producers or that 
                                                 
1 The empirical relationship between environmental policy and technological development is left 
aside. However, Jaffe et al. (2002) provide a thorough guide to the literature on this topic. 
Specifically, they provide an overview on analytical frameworks for investigating technological 
change. Furthermore, they turn their attention to theoretical analysis of the effects of 
environmental policy on technological change, and focus further on issues related to empirical 
analysis of technological change. See also Jaffe et al. (1995).  Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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regulation causes efficiency losses. Then, by definition, there is no positive 
correlation between environmental regulation and efficiency. Therefore, this 
approach cannot be applied to test the efficiency part of the Porter hypothesis.  
 
This paper tests the efficiency part of the Porter hypothesis by applying an output 
efficiency measure, i.e., the directional output distance function, where producers 
are assumed to become more efficient when they increase good outputs at the 
same time as decreasing bad outputs. In addition, the test procedure adopted does 
not, a priori, impose any restriction on the effects of environmental regulation on 
efficiency. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, an interpretation of the 
Porter hypothesis is outlined and, in addition, some theoretical research that 
criticizes or partly finds support for the hypothesis is reviewed. Section 3 briefly 
presents a theoretical foundation to measure technical output efficiency involving 
the directional output distance function. In Section 4 the empirical model is 
provided, starting with a parameterization of the distance function and ending 
with a description of the suggested test concerning the efficiency part of the Porter 
hypothesis. Section 5 presents the data, and Section 6 provides the empirical 
results. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2  THE PORTER HYPOTHESIS 
The Porter hypothesis has been, and still is, subject to vivid debate. The 
discussion in the economic literature focuses not only on the general question of 
whether the hypothesis should be rejected or not, but also on the more delicate 
problem of how to interpret it. For instance, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) write: “More 
systematic economic analysis of the Porter hypothesis is hindered by ambiguity as 
to exactly what the hypothesis is” (p. 610). However, my interpretation of the 
Porter hypothesis, based on Porter and van der Linde (1995), is here outlined in 
Figure 1. 














Figure 1  The Porter hypothesis 
 
The production possibilities of the economy are initially defined as the output set 
within the bold curve. Given an environmental policy that demands an 
environmental quality of at least size M
*, the production possibility set will be 
confined to the area that is to the right of the vertical line M
* and within the bold 
curve. The Porter hypothesis means that if M
* represents a relatively lax 
environmental policy, the producers may be unaware of existing improvements 
that can be made. In the figure this is characterized by producing at point A, 
which means that the production of goods and services equals Q
*. At point A, it is 
technologically possible to produce more goods and services without using more 
inputs and worsening environmental quality. In other words, the producers are 
technically inefficient.  
 
Now suppose that the environmental requirements are sharpened and that the 
environmental restriction moves from M
* to M
**. According to the hypothesis, 
this will make the producers aware of their own performance, reveal inefficiencies 
and give the producers an incentive to change their behavior. In Figure 1, this is 
illustrated by a movement from point A to point B. At point B, producer 
efficiency is higher than at point A, as the production of goods and services has 
increased from Q
* to Q
**. Furthermore, compliance costs due to the stricter 
environmental regulation also make environmentally friendlier technological Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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development relatively less costly, which, in turn, generates better products, more 
developed processes and so on. This is represented by an outward shift of the 
production possibility curve, which means that with a given set of resources it is 
now possible to produce more goods and services without worsening the 
environmental quality or vice versa. These innovations enable the producers to 
move from point B to point C. The total effect on output from the stricter 
environmental requirement is then the sum of the efficiency gain (Q
**-Q
*) and the 




The Porter hypothesis has been heavily criticized by economists who argue that 
the hypothesis lacks theoretical foundation. The question commonly raised is why 
regulation actually is needed for producers to take privately beneficial measures. 
For instance, the objection in Palmer et al. (1995) is that producers always have 
the option to make environmentally friendly investments. The fact that they do not 
do so voluntarily reveals that they regard such investments as unprofitable. There 
is no free or even paid lunch, i.e., there are no $10 bills waiting to be picked up, as 
Porter and van der Linde (1995, p. 99) state. In addition, Palmer et al. (1995) 
mean that the argument of a free or even paid lunch diverts attention from the 
cost-benefit analysis of environmental policy, which is highly necessary from a 
societal point of view. 
 
However, there are theoretical papers that partly find support for the Porter 
hypothesis. Following the hypothesis, the papers discussed below are all based on 
the assumption that newer capital is more productive and less polluting than older 
capital. In Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) the exogenous shock from an 
emission tax per unit of emissions induces the firm to reach for new available 
technology, which then is relatively less costly. Within an infinite horizon optimal 
control problem, where the firm maximizes profits, they show that stricter 
environmental policy cannot be expected to provide a ‘win-win’ situation in the 
sense of increasing both environmental quality and the firm’s profitability. 
However, even though the stricter policy causes the total capital stock to shrink 
(downsizing effect), the ensuing capital investments reduce the average age of the 
capital stock and, thus, increase its productivity (modernization effect). 
Furthermore, within a general equilibrium framework, Mohr (2002) provides a Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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learning-by-doing model, which shows that endogenous technological change 
makes the Porter hypothesis feasible. The productivity of any given firm depends 
on the cumulative production experience of all firms using the same (old) 
technology. In this model external economies of scale in production prevent the 
individual firm from adopting a newer, already available, technology. The reason 
is that employees have less experience of the new technology, which then initially 
would lower the firm’s productivity and, therefore, cause short-run costs in terms 
of lost competitiveness. The result in Mohr (2002) shows that if the government 
pursues an environmental policy that requires all firms to adopt the newer 
technology, then the policy could both improve environmental quality and 
increase beneficial output, as employees in the long-run reach a sufficient 
experience of that technology. Finally, within the scope of game theory, involving 
a division manager and a firm (shareholders) that maximize private utility, and a 
social welfare maximizing regulator that grants maximally allowed emission 
levels, Ambec and Barla (2002) show that the Porter hypothesis is likely to be 
valid under certain circumstances. Regulation is found to have a positive impact 
on investment in R&D since the marginal benefit to investment increases. One 
condition that then contributes to the validity of the hypothesis is a high likelihood 
that the R&D program generates a cleaner technology that also brings a 
sufficiently high marginal productivity gain. 
 
The results in Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999), Mohr (2002), and Ambec and 
Barla (2002) indicate that the assumption of imperfect information is not crucial 
to derive results consistent with the Porter hypothesis. Furthermore, these papers 
focus on technological change (when assuming maximization behavior), which in 
Figure 1 is represented by an outward shift of the production possibility curve. 
However, Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that firms, of course, do not 
always make optimal choices, and that competition is characterized by: “(…) 
organizational inertia and control problems reflecting the difficulty of aligning 
individual, group and corporate incentives” (p. 99). In this paper, this is 
interpreted such that resources may not be optimally utilized and, therefore, there 
exists intrafirm technical output inefficiency, which, in Figure 1, answers to point 
A. According to the Porter hypothesis environmental regulation induces firms 
operating at point A to move towards the production possibility frontier, e.g., to Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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point B. To develop a procedure for an empirical test of the significance of this 
particular hypothesis, a theoretical foundation to measure technical output 
efficiency is first given in the next section. 
 
3 THEORY 
The directional output distance function approach adopted to estimate technical 
output efficiency originates from Färe et al. (2002). Formally, let 
M
M y y y + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J b b b + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  be vectors of good outputs and bad 
outputs, respectively, and let 
N
N x x x + ℜ ∈ = ) ,..., ( 1  be a vector of inputs. The 
technology of reference is the output possibilities set,  ) (x P , which, for a given 
vector of inputs, denotes all technically feasible output vectors. The output set is 
assumed to be convex and compact with  } 0 , 0 { ) 0 ( = P . Furthermore, inputs and 
good outputs are assumed to be freely disposable and bad outputs only weakly 
disposable. Finally, good outputs are assumed to be null-joint with the bad 
outputs. The directional output distance function is defined on  ) (x P  as 
 
() ( ) ( ) { } x P g b g y g b y x D b y ∈ ⋅ − ⋅ + = β β β
β
, : max ; , ,  (1) 
 
which inherits its properties from  ) (x P . The solution, 
∗ β , gives the maximum 
expansion and contraction of good outputs and bad outputs, respectively. The 
vector ) , ( b y g g g − =  specifies in what direction an output vector,  ) ( ) , ( x P b y ∈ , is 
scaled so as to reach the boundary of the output set at 
) ( ) , ( x P g b g y b y ∈ ⋅ − ⋅ +
∗ ∗ β β , where  ) ; , , ( g b y x D =
∗ β . This means that the 
producer becomes more efficient when simultaneously increasing good outputs 
and decreasing bad outputs.
2 The directional output distance function takes the 
value of zero for technically efficient output vectors on the boundary of  ) (x P ,  
                                                 
2 In this paper, the directional vector g = (1,-1) is chosen for the sake of simplicity. An alternative 
would be to choose the vector g = (y,-b), which has been done when estimating the directional 
output distance function by non-parametric linear techniques, see, e.g., Chung et al. (1997). Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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whereas positive values apply to technically inefficient output vectors below the 
boundary. The higher the value the more inefficient the output vector. 
 
4  THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
4.1  The functional form of the distance function 
Following Färe et al. (2002), the directional output distance function is 
parameterized by using a (additive) quadratic flexible functional form, which for 
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where  κ  and τ  represent producer and time specific effects, respectively. 
Equation (2) will be estimated by a linear programming technique, subject to 




4.2  Testing the Porter hypothesis 
Once the technical output efficiency scores for each individual producer, k , in 
each period, t, are estimated, parametric tests on different hypotheses regarding 
the variability in efficiency can be performed. A general model for testing the 
Porter hypothesis is formulated as follows 
                                                 
3 The particular estimation approach applied is described in detail in Marklund (2003). See also 









kt R ED ε ψ ρ ω φ + + + + = ⋅ ∑
=1
) (  (3) 
 
where  () ⋅
kt ED  is the previously estimated technical output efficiency of producer 
k  in time period t,  j R  represents the intensity of pursued environmental policy 
regarding the  th j :  bad output, while  k ρ  and  t ψ represent plant specific effects 
and time specific effects, respectively.
4 The last term on the right-hand side, ε , is 
an error term that is uncorrelated with all other right-hand side variables and 
uncorrelated in time and across plants. The parameters to be estimated are φ ,  j ω , 
where  J j ,..., 1 = ,  k ρ , where  K k ,..., 2 = , and  t ψ , where  T t ,..., 2 = . Performing 
t-tests on the estimates of  j ω  is synonymous with testing the Porter hypothesis. 
 
To approximate the stringency of pursued environmental policy, a regulatory 
intensity measure is used. Gollop and Roberts (1983) developed an intensity 
measure divided into two parts, one measuring the severity of emission standards 
and the other measuring the standards’ extent of enforcement. The enforcement 
part reflects the degree to which actual emission levels correspond to maximally 
allowed levels and, therefore, also accounts for the possibility that a producer may 
fail to comply with a standard. However, since emissions are included as bad 
outputs in the directional output distance function, the enforcement factor is 
embedded in its parameter estimates. For instance, shadow prices of bad outputs 
derived from this function are indicators of how producers perceive emission 
standards (see, e.g., Färe et al., 2002; Marklund, 2003). Therefore, the intensity of 
pursued environmental policy is here approximated using only the severity part of 
the Gollop and Roberts (1983) measure. Accordingly, the environmental 
regulatory intensity index concerning the j:th bad output is calculated for each 
producer as 
 
                                                 
4 An alternative to the plant specific effects, i.e., the fixed effects, would be to model random 
effects. However, the random effects model was rejected in this case since the fixed effects 
model explains technical output efficiency to a much greater extent.   Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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,  is the desired, or unconstrained, emission rate for producer k, and 
kt MAX
j b
,  is the maximally allowed emission rate for producer k in period t.
5 The 
regulatory index measures, as a percentage, the difference between the 
unconstrained emission rate and the maximally allowed emission rate that are 
imposed on the producers. When no emission is allowed  0 =
MAX
j b  and  j R  is set 
to unity, which means that the authorities consider it best to shut down the 
production.
6 In contrast,  j R  is bounded from below by zero, reflecting that 




j b b = .
7 In this case 
the emission standards have no effect on the environment. 
 
5 DATA 
The directional output distance function is estimated using data on the Swedish 
pulp and paper industry gathered by Statistics Sweden and the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency. The data set available is an unbalanced panel 
that contains annual information on 12 plants producing pulp. It extends over the 
period 1983-1990, with a total of 86 observations. To produce the good output, 
pulp,  1 y , each plant is assumed to use four inputs; wood fiber,  1 x , labor,  2 x , 
electricity,  3 x , and capital,  4 x . Simultaneously produced bad outputs, landing in 
surrounding waters, are oxygen-demanding substances,  1 b , and suspended solids, 
2 b . More detailed information on inputs and outputs is provided in Marklund 
(2003). 
 
For the purpose of testing the Porter hypothesis in accordance with equation (3), 
some additional information must be considered. A substantial part of the 
                                                 
5 Desired and maximally allowed emission levels are further commented on in Section 5. 
6 As mentioned in Section 3, the good outputs are null-joint with the bad outputs. This means that 
good outputs cannot be produced without producing bad outputs. 
7 It is assumed that b
MAX cannot exceed b
DES. Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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emissions into the Gulf of Bothnia, the Bothnian Sea, and the Baltic Sea 
originates from the pulp and paper industry. To ensure a better quality of these 
waters, the National Licensing Board of Environment Protection, active during the 
period under study, granted the plants non-tradable emission permits.
8 Thus, the 
plants are in each year constrained by maximally allowed emission levels of 
oxygen-demanding substances, 
MAX b1 .
9 This information is used in the 
construction of the environmental regulatory intensity index in equation (4). 
Furthermore, the index demands data on the desired emission level for every 
plant, 
DES b1 , which here is assumed to equal each plant’s highest emission level 
that is observed in the sample.
10 Descriptive statistics for the variables used to test 
the Porter hypothesis are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
 
6 RESULTS 
The directional output distance function is estimated using mean normalized input 
and output data.
11 The estimated values of the function are technical output 
efficiency scores for all of the 86 observations. Table 1 provides these scores in 
the form of arithmetic averages for each plant, for the whole sample, and at mean 
of the data. Regulatory intensity concerning oxygen-demanding substances, 
calculated in accordance with equation (4), is also provided. 
 
                                                 
8 Regarding this particular procedure, see Marklund (2003). 
9 Due to lack of data, the Porter hypothesis is not tested for restrictions on discharges of suspended 
solids. 
10 Each plant’s desired emission level could be derived from the estimated distance function, by 
letting (∂ D/∂ b1)/ (∂ D/∂ y1) = 0, i.e., letting the marginal abatement cost of b1 in terms of y1 be 
zero, and then solve for b1. In this study the resulting desired emission levels for oxygen-
demanding substances are on average about 33 times higher (about 16 times higher if one 
particular plant is excluded) than actually observed emission levels. Whether this is in 
accordance with reality or not is left unanswered. However, independently of which of the 
definitions of desired emission level that is adopted, the outcome of the Porter hypothesis test 
performed in this paper is roughly the same.  
11 The parameter estimates are provided in Marklund (2003), Table A3, where exactly the same 
estimating procedure is applied on the same data as in this paper. Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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Table 1  Technical efficiency scores and environmental regulatory intensity 
values for mean normalized variable quantities (standard deviations in 
parentheses) 
 






1  0.026 (0.036)  0.271 (0.290) 
2  0.004 (0.008)  0.080 (0.103) 
3  0.017 (0.018)  0.371 (0.046) 
4  0.022 (0.016)  0.593 (0.088) 
5  0.033 (0.026)  0.409 (0.012) 
6  0.006 (0.006)  0.000 (0.000) 
7  0.023 (0.031)  0.451 (0.049) 
8  0.016 (0.022)  0.215 (0.397) 
9  0.030 (0.034)  0.610 (0.064) 
10  0.040 (0.047)  0.665 (0.160) 
11  0.066 (0.041)  0.523 (0.037) 
12  0.044 (0.052)  0.297 (0.278) 
Average  0.027 (0.033)  0.378 (0.263) 
At mean  0.118 - 
 
For the hypothetical plant that during 1983-1990 used the sample mean of inputs 
to produce the sample mean of outputs, the estimated value of the distance 
function, 0.118, indicates a technical output inefficiency of 11.8 percent. This 
means that, without changing input quantity and/or developing technology, the ‘at 
mean’ producing plant could increase the production of pulp with 255.5*0.118 = 
30.15 thousand tons, while simultaneously decreasing the production of oxygen-
demanding substances and suspended solids with 34.9*0.118 = 4,12 and 
1.8*0.118 = 0.21 thousand tons, respectively.
12 In addition, the average 
inefficiency ranges between plants from a low of 0.004 to a high of 0.066, and for 
the whole sample the corresponding figure is 0.027. This indicates that there is a 
possible ‘win-win’ potential to increase production and reduce pollution, as 
suggested by the Porter hypothesis. Furthermore, environmental regulatory 
                                                 
12 Remember that the distance function is estimated on mean normalized data, and that the mean 
quantity of pulp is 255.5 thousand tons, of oxygen-demanding substances is 34.9 thousand tons, 
and of suspended solids is 1.8 thousand tons. Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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intensity ranges from a low of 0.000 to a high of 0.665. The latter value is 
interpreted such that the regulatory authority wants to reduce the emission level 
with 66.5 percent compared to the plant’s desired emission level. The 
corresponding average figure for the whole sample is 37.8 percent. 
 
The Porter hypothesis test is performed in accordance with the model in (3), and 
the outcome of regressing estimated technical output efficiency scores,  ) (⋅ ED , on 
calculated regulatory intensity index and dummy variables capturing plant 
specific effects is presented in Table 2.
13 
 
Table 2  The Porter hypothesis test 
Coefficient Variable Estimate  t-value 
φ  intercept  0.0298 2.4240 
ω1  regulatory index, R1  -0.0142 -0.7143 
ρ2  plant 2  -0.0249 -1.4954 
ρ3  plant 3  -0.0075 -0.4602 
ρ4  plant 4  0.0003 0.0200 
ρ5  plant 5  0.0091 0.5701 
ρ6  plant 6  -0.0238 -1.3381 
ρ7  plant 7  -0.0004 -0.0252 
ρ8  plant 8  -0.0111 -0.7061 
ρ9  Plant 9  0.0090 0.5271 
ρ10  plant 10  0.0198 1.1002 
ρ11  plant 11  0.0436 2.4684 
ρ12  plant 12  0.0184 1.1316 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1059 
Number of observations 86 
 
If maximally allowed emission levels of oxygen-demanding substances are 
lowered, the regulatory intensity,  1 R , will increase. As can be noted from the 
estimated coefficient,  1 ω , this will increase efficiency in the sense that the value 
of ) (⋅ ED  decreases. However, this particular coefficient of the regulatory 
                                                 
13 None of the time dummy variables are significant and are therefore excluded, resulting in a 
higher adjusted R-squared value. A time trend hypothesis was also tested and rejected. Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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intensity is not significantly different from zero and, therefore, the conclusion is 
that the result shows no support for the Porter hypothesis. That is, the test 
provides no evidence that environmental standards made the Swedish pulp plants 
under study more resource efficient during 1983-1990. However, the opposite 
cannot be concluded either, i.e., that regulation made the plants more resource 
inefficient.  
  
7  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper is devoted to proposing a procedure to empirically test the Porter 
hypothesis, introduced in Porter (1991) and further developed in Porter and van 
der Linde (1995). The dominating argument of the hypothesis is that 
environmental regulation not only increases environmental quality, but also 
provides information, which makes the producers more aware of state of 
productivity and possibilities to improve competitiveness. The productivity 
change is divided into an efficiency change and a technological change. 
 
The procedure suggested is general in the sense that it can be applied to any 
production process at the firm, industry, or country level. It provides a tool to 
study the efficiency part of the Porter hypothesis, which argues that producers use 
resources inefficiently and that environmental regulation sends signals about these 
inefficiencies and induces them to change their behavior. The hypothesis may be 
empirically analyzed by testing whether there is a positive significant correlation 
between producers’ technical output efficiency and environmental regulation.  
 
Technical output efficiency is first estimated using a methodology that originates 
from Färe et al. (2002). The production technology is here represented by the 
directional output distance function, which is defined to credit a simultaneous 
expansion of good outputs and contraction of bad outputs. This means that a 
producer is interpreted as becoming more efficient when increasing the production 
of the market goods at the same time as emissions are decreased, given input 
quantity and technology. The distance function is further specified using a 
quadratic flexible functional form and computed by a linear programming 
technique. Then, by regressing the obtained efficiency scores on environmental Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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regulatory stringency, approximated by a regulatory intensity index that measures 
the difference between the unconstrained and the maximally allowed emission 
rate, the Porter hypothesis is explicitly tested.  
 
The suggested test procedure is applied on 12 Swedish pulp plants during 1983-
1990. The result shows no support for the Porter hypothesis. That is, the test 
provides no evidence that environmental regulation made the pulp plants more 
resource efficient during the period under study. Environmental Regulation and Firm Efficiency …. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1  Definitions and mean statistics for variables included in the Porter 
hypothesis test (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Variable  1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 


































1983-1990  Variable 
mean min  max 
R1  0.378 
(0.263) 
0.000 0.859 




1 R  = environmental regulatory intensity index for mean normalized quantities of 
oxygen-demanding substances 
) (⋅ ED  =  estimated technical output efficiency scores for mean normalized 
variable quantities;  1 y  = pulp, 255.5 thousand tons,  1 b  = biological and chemical 
oxygen-demanding substances, 34.9 thousand  tons,  2 b  = suspended solids, 1.8 
thousand tons 